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Form, Substance and Recharacterisation 
PEY-WOAN LEE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At common law, a court may ‘recharacterise’ a contract when it is satisfied that the transaction 
it embodies is substantially different from the label assigned to it by the parties. This process 
of recharacterisation is well-established in many legal spheres including those of employment, 
trusts, property, taxation and secured financing. Whether a transaction should be 
recharacterised is routinely said to depend on its ‘substance’. Typically, this refrain is made to 
underscore the point that a court will not be bound by the label or form selected by the parties. 
However, precisely what constitutes ‘substance’ is less clear. Generally, a party seeking to 
recharacterise a transaction may do so on one of two grounds: first, that the transaction was a 
sham and hence unenforceable; or secondly, that on a true construction of the document, the 
transaction belongs to a category different from that identified by the parties. So expressed, 
these techniques engender the impression that recharacterisation – the location of ‘substance’ 
– is largely a matter of doctrinal analysis free from value judgment. But a closer inspection will 
reveal that the process is more textured and fine-grained.  
This chapter examines the jurisprudence of recharacterisations in the areas of tenancy, 
employment, trusts and financing arrangements. 1  It argues that the characterisation of a 
transaction is always a question of law informed by policy considerations. Specifically, 
recharacterisations are concerned with avoidances so the central question is whether and to 
what extent parties are legally permitted to ‘contract out’ of a statutory regime or the legal 
incidents of a relationship. As such, the process of recharacterisation is neither reducible to the 
application of narrow legal doctrines nor merely an exercise in contractual interpretation. As 
will be observed, English courts generally incorporate policy considerations in this discourse 
but are accustomed to presenting them as ancillary (rather than primary) justifications in their 
reasoning. Only in legislative contexts such as those protecting tenants or employees where the 
policy underpinnings are unambiguous is a court likely to base a decision squarely on the 
pursuit of the legislative goal. In other cases, they are wont to retreat to the sanctuary of rules 
and doctrines. On the whole, therefore, the English judicial method in this context is more 
 
* I am deeply grateful to Professors Lusina Ho and Kelvin Low for their invaluable comments on an earlier draft. 
My gratitude extends also to the participants at Obligations IX conference for their helpful comments and 
encouragement. All errors are my responsibility. 
1 Questions of characterisation are also common in tax disputes but that is an area better left to specialist treatment. 
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formal than substantive. 2  This predilection is not objectionable or detrimental where the 
relevant substantive concerns are balanced and embedded in the formal rules. But formal 
reasoning may descend into formalistic reasoning if the rules so harden as to eclipse important 
substantive concerns. This chapter contends that this risk subsists in recharacterisation cases. 
To minimise that risk, it is critical that judges articulate the interplay of values, policies and 
doctrines resulting in a particular characterisation. Similarly, courts should develop the broad 
techniques of recharacterisation (viz, shams and construction) more flexibly to make room for 
the evaluation of substantive reasons.  
II. THE NATURE OF RECHARACTERISATION 
Questions of characterisation arise in a wide variety of contexts. The characterisation of a 
particular issue in a dispute may, for example, determine which system of law is applicable to 
resolve that dispute.3 The remedial consequence of a breach of obligation may depend on 
whether the obligation is ‘fiduciary’ in character.4 Or a term of a contract may be unenforceable 
if it were properly characterised as a ‘penalty’.5 This chapter is concerned with characterisation 
in a narrower context, viz, situations where the characterisation of a transaction has been 
expressed in written form but which is challenged on the ground that the form is not reflective 
of its substance.  
At the outset, it is necessary to clarify that the process of characterisation is distinguished 
from that of interpretation or construction.6 The latter is concerned with ascertaining the 
meaning of words and language so as to determine their application to a set of facts whereas 
the former seeks to identify the legal category of a transaction in order to determine its legal 
effects. However, characterisation and interpretation are also intertwined in that 
characterisation is premised on an accurate understanding of the intended effects of the conduct 
constituting the transaction. In other words, a transaction can only be characterised if the 
conduct making up the transaction has first been construed. Where the transaction is effected 
by a written document, the construction of the document will, of course, precede categorisation.  
 
2 PS Atiyah and RS Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative Study of Legal 
Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987). 
3 Macmillan v Bishopsgate (No 3) [1996] 1 WLR 387. 
4 Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41.  
5 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, [2016] AC 1172. 
6 G McMeel, The Construction of Contracts: Interpretation, Implication and Rectification, 3rd edn (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2017) para 1.20. 
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This inter-relation of construction and characterisation is summed up by Lord Millett in 
Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, a case concerned with the characterisation of 
charges, as a two-stage process: 
At the first stage it must construe the instrument of charge and seek to gather the intentions of 
the parties from the language they have used. But the object at this stage of the process is not 
to discover whether the parties intended to create a fixed or a floating charge. It is to ascertain 
the nature of the rights and obligations which the parties intended to grant each other in 
respect of the charged assets. Once these have been ascertained, the court can then embark on 
the second stage of the process, which is one of categorisation. This is a matter of law. It does 
not depend on the intention of the parties. If their intention, properly gathered from the 
language of the instrument, is to grant the company rights in respect of the charged assets 
which are inconsistent with the nature of a fixed charge, then the charge cannot be a fixed 
charge however they may have chosen to describe it.7 
On this account, characterisation comprises: first, an interpretive stage to establish the 
intended rights and obligations as a matter of fact; and secondly, an analytical or evaluative 
stage where the court decides how those rights and obligations ought to be classified as a matter 
of law. Differentiating between these distinct stages is important as the evaluative nature of the 
second stage is often overlooked or concealed. In order to decide if an act or transaction falls 
within a particular legal category, the court is first required to distill the ‘objective criterion’ 
that defines that particular category. 8  That process of abstraction invariably requires an 
appraisal of the values pertinent to the issue in question. Writing extra-judicially, Chief Justice 
Allsop explains the process as ‘one where a value judgment is made by reference to ascribed 
meaning, found facts, an expressed principle or rule and the relevantly organised values that 
are to be brought to bear for the task’.9  Thus, a court that has to decide if a particular 
relationship is fiduciary in nature would first have to identify the values that define such 
relationships. That defining value – protecting those vulnerable to abuse by reason of reposing 
trust, confidence and power in another – is gleaned not by syllogistic reasoning or logical 
interpretation alone but also by an appreciation of the characteristics and policy underpinnings 
of accepted categories of fiduciaries (such as trustees, agents and directors).10 An exercise in 
characterisation therefore encompasses but is more than, and distinct from, mere 
 
7 Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] UKPC 28, [2001] 2 AC 710 [32] (‘Brumark’).  
8 Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] BCLC 148, 160 (‘Welsh Development’). Eg, the 
criterion applicable to tenancy relationships is that of ‘exclusive possession’, the employer’s ‘control’ in the case 
of employment relations, and the ‘divestment of ownership’ in the context of trusts. 
9 J Allsop, ‘Characterisation: Its Place in Contractual Analysis and Related Enquiries’ (2017) 91 Australian Law 
Journal 471, 471 (emphasis added).  
10 ibid 474. 
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interpretation.11 The failure to keep the two processes apart may sometimes obscure the true 
justifications of a particular characterisation.  
For recharacterisation, the evaluative function of the process bears an additional dimension 
as courts are essentially tasked to decide the legitimacy of attempts to avoid particular legal 
classifications and their attendant legal consequences. Or, to take an alternative perspective, it 
is a process that delimits contractual or individual freedom. For that reason, the process of 
recharacterisation inevitably involves the assessment of the social, moral or economic aims of 
a particular legal regime. Specifically, courts would have to weigh the value of self-
determinacy against the interests protected by the legal regime that is being circumvented. That 
tension is not resolved by simply uncovering the factual meaning of parties’ conduct (for 
example, interpretation) but requires the reasoned prioritisation of competing interests. 
Recharacterisation thus encapsulates a normative inquiry as to what legal consequences ought 
to be, and not merely what they are.   
Seen in this light, recharacterisation functions as a judicial tool for policing illegitimate 
avoidances.12 That explains why the exercise would often require departures from the usual 
rules of contractual or documentary construction. Where the contractual or written form is itself 
the means by which parties seek to circumvent a particular legal regime, the court must be able 
to look past that form to ascertain what the real transaction is in order to decide how that 
transaction should be characterised. It must have access to evidence extrinsic to the written 
contract or document, including the parties’ subjective intention and subsequent conduct,13 for 
 
11 Allsop cites the classification of contractual terms as an instance of such conflation: ibid 478–80. In that context, 
the question whether a term is a condition, warranty or innominate term is said to depend on parties’ intention as 
discerned from the contract taking into account the contract’s ‘nature, purpose and circumstances’ (Bunge 
Corporation New York v Tradax Export SA, Panama [1981] 1 WLR 711, 717). But while the discovery of ‘parties’ 
intention’ is customarily thought to be a matter of interpretation, courts would in fact have to evaluate the 
importance of the term and the seriousness of its breach to decide if it is a condition or an innominate term (see 
Torvald Klaveness A/S v Arni Maritime Corp [1994] 1 WLR 1465, 1476 where Lord Mustill observed that ‘[the] 
classification of an obligation as a condition or an “innominate” term is largely determined by its practical 
importance in the scheme of the contract’). The classification of terms, therefore, is necessarily ‘framed by an 
understanding of the context (including commercial context) and imperatives of a given contract or type of 
contract. It is from that understanding that the relevant values are drawn’ (ibid 481).  
12 See, in relation to shams, M Stewart, ‘The Judicial Doctrine in Australia’ in E Simpson and M Stewart (eds), 
Sham Transactions (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) para 3.56. See also Re Watson (1890) 25 QBD 27, 
33. 
13 Hitch v Stone [2001] EWCA Civ 63, [2001] STC 214 [65]–[66]. 
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otherwise it would be ‘led by the nose into the artificial task of defining the legal rights and 
obligations of the parties by reference to their proved documents and related conduct alone’.14 
III. FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REASONING 
Understanding recharacterisation in this way makes clear that the courts’ reference to 
‘substance’ in this context is but a shorthand for the composite analysis that it undertakes. Such 
an analysis looks past the parties’ labels to take into account the interpretation of the written 
document, the nature of the transaction or relationship that parties are purporting to create, the 
policy concerns residing in the relevant legal or legislative context and the extent to which it is 
permissible to ‘contract out’ of that legal or regulatory framework.15 To the extent that such an 
approach requires the court to articulate the policy reasons for a particular characterisation, this 
emphasis on ‘substance’ may be seen as instances of substantive reasoning. According to 
Patrick Atiyah and Robert Summers, substantive reasoning is characterised by the use of 
‘moral, economic, political, institutional or other social consideration’ to justify an outcome.16 
It is contrasted with formal reasoning, which bases a decision on legally authoritative precepts, 
such as legal rules, to exclude from consideration other countervailing substantive reasons.17 
However, the discussion below will suggest that English courts have not, in cases of 
recharacterisation, always equated ‘substance’ with substantive reasoning. Instead, they do 
often, in keeping with the general preference for formal reasoning, apply formal rules and 
doctrines to ascertain the ‘substance’ of a transaction. This is not in itself problematic because 
frequently, the rule and doctrine being applied is itself founded on adequate substantive 
reasoning. But formal reasoning may degenerate into formalistic reasoning, which is 
detrimental, when there is ‘a failure to take substantive considerations into account when they 
ought to be taken into account’.18 This may occur when formal reasoning so dominates as to 
conceal or suppress policy concerns germane to the issue at hand.   
 
14 Raftland Pty Ltd as Trustee of the Raftland Trust v Commissioner of Taxation [2008] HCA 21, (2008) 238 CLR 
516 [151].  
15 Without so expanding, the term ‘substance’ is a type of ‘meaningless reference’ as it does not, by itself, provide 
any specific basis for drawing a particular conclusion: J Stone, Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasoning (London, 
Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1964) 241. 
16 Atiyah and Summers, above n 2, 1. 
17 ibid 2. 
18 ibid 29. 
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IV. RECHARACTERISATION TECHNIQUES 
In Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd, 19  Staughton LJ identified two 
recharacterisation techniques. The first is to establish the written document as a ‘sham’ that 
does not represent the parties’ true position. Absent evidence of sham, the second route is to 
characterise the transaction by interpreting the written document to ascertain the nature and 
effects of its terms. A key distinction between the two techniques is that the first ‘external’ 
route allows the court to look to extrinsic evidence to prove the existence of a separate 
agreement that is not reflected by the written contract, whilst the second ‘internal’ route 
considers principally the parties’ agreement ‘on the basis that the parties intended to be bound 
by its terms, and nothing else’.20 The latter, in so far as it requires only proof of internal 
inconsistency, is commonly thought to be a matter of contractual interpretation.21  
Although ‘sham’ reasoning has been employed in a wide range of contexts, its precise scope 
and rationale remain unsettled. Modern expositions invariably begin with Diplock LJ’s dictum 
in Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd,22 which confined ‘shams’ to situations 
where parties enter into a false transaction with the common intention to mislead a third party. 
So defined, the concept is of very limited application. Quite apart from the high threshold for 
proof of dishonest collusion, courts are unwilling to make findings of sham that have the effects 
of castigating parties as dishonest and undermining commercial certainty.23 As a result, courts 
confronting blatant instances of avoidance have on occasion had to either extend the concept 
to include cases where only one party acted with the intention to mislead, or developed adjacent 
principles (such as ‘pretences’) to recharacterise the transaction in question. In other contexts, 
courts have adhered to a narrow concept of ‘sham’ but also applied the ‘internal’ route more 
robustly to police avoidances. On the whole, the judicial approach to ‘shams’ is mixed: it is 
 
19 Welsh Development [1992] BCLC 148.  
20 Welsh Development [1992] BCLC 148, 187 (emphasis added). 
21 ‘Once the documents are accepted as genuinely representing the transaction into which the parties have entered, 
its proper legal categorization is a matter of construction of the documents’: Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial 
Management Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 78, 84 (Millett LJ) (‘Orion’). 
22 Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786, 802 (‘Snook’): ‘[sham] means acts done or 
documents executed by the parties to the “sham” which are intended by them to give to third parties or to the court 
the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights 
and obligations (if any) which the parties intend to create. But one thing, I think, is clear in legal principle, morality 
and the authorities … that for acts or documents to be a “sham,” with whatever legal consequences follow form 
this, all the parties thereto must have a common intention that the acts or documents are not to create the legal 
rights and obligations which they give the appearance of creating’ (footnotes omitted). 
23 National Westminster Bank plc v Jones [2001] EWCA Civ 1541, [2001] 1 BCLC 98 [59] (‘Westminster Bank’). 
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more flexible and substantive in contexts (such as tenancy and employment) where the strength 
of the legislative policy warrants a robust response, but more formal and restrictive in cases 
(such as those in trusts and financing) where legal certainty is prioritised above other concerns. 
The ‘internal’ route of recharacterisation is employed when there is no apparent discordance 
between the form of the transaction and the parties’ actual practice but the legal incidents of 
the transaction do not in fact correspond to those of the named category. Because its focus is 
on the terms of the document or contract, this technique may sometimes be construed as a mere 
interpretative exercise centred on the parties’ contractual intention. As explained,24 this is a 
reductive view of recharacterisation since the process is in fact interpretive and evaluative. 
Conceiving the process as one of construction or interpretation alone may also result in 
formalistic reasoning if it misleads the court to place excessive weight on the language chosen 
by parties (or, in the case of statutory interpretation, the literal meaning of a statute). 
Fortunately, English courts have (in the contexts considered below) generally avoided this 
pitfall by incorporating substantive reasoning into the ‘construction’ process. Nevertheless, the 
risk of formalistic reasoning subsists as formal reasoning remains dominant, such that 
substantive reasons are usually cited only as secondary reasons for a preferred characterisation. 
V. TENANCY AGREEMENTS 
In this context, English courts have employed recharacterisation techniques principally to 
counteract illegitimate avoidances of tenancy protection legislation. Typically, they are 
situations where landlords sought to disguise leases as licences to avoid statutory controls on 
rent or security of tenure. Although these devices have largely receded with the deregulation 
of the private rental market from the 1980s,25 the cases decided in this context remain important 
examples of the situations in which recharacterisations are appropriate. 
In the leading case of Street v Mountford,26 the House of Lords characterised an agreement 
granting exclusive possession as a lease even though it was labelled as a licence. As the sole 
factual criterion for distinguishing between a lease and a licence is that of exclusive possession, 
the agreement is a lease once that criterion is satisfied; the parties could not alter that legal 
characterisation simply by giving it a different name. In the famous words of Lord Templeman, 
‘The manufacture of a five-pronged implement for manual digging results in a fork even if the 
 
24 See above, Section II. 
25 S Bright, H Glover and J Prassl, ‘Tenancy Agreements’ in E Simpson and M Stewart (eds), Sham Transactions 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) paras 6.52–6.54.  
26 Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809 (‘Street’). 
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manufacturer, unfamiliar with the English language, insists that he intended to make and has 
made a spade’.27  
Street was arguably a decision reached via the internal route as it was not alleged that the 
agreement involved a sham.28 The fact of exclusive possession was conceded,29 and the court’s 
only task was to decide if that operative feature was consistent with the agreement’s stated 
form. Nevertheless, Lord Templeman made clear that the court would have been equally ‘astute 
to detect and frustrate sham devices and artificial transactions whose only object is to disguise 
the grant of a tenancy and to evade the Rent Acts’.30 In practice, however, shams in the Snook 
sense are rare in this context as tenants would not usually have shared in the landlord’s evasive 
intention. More commonly, the landlord would have sought to include in the agreement 
provisions denying exclusive possession, which the tenant accepted either without 
understanding or without belief that they would be enforced. In Antoniades v Villiers,31 a 
landlord letting a single room to a couple sought to create a licence by including in the 
agreements a clause (Clause 16) that allowed him (or his nominee) to enter and share the room 
with the couple. The House of Lords held that Clause 16 was a ‘pretence’ rather than a genuine 
reservation of power to share occupation with the tenants.32 A critical factor that led to this 
finding was the observation that the premises was too small for sharing between strangers.33 
Given that the couple were seeking a quasi-matrimonial home, there was ‘an air of total 
unreality’ in the terms seeking to negate the grant of exclusive possession.34 The agreements 
in question therefore created a lease and the tenants were protected under the Rent Acts.  
Antoniades was seen by some commentators to have extended ‘shams’ beyond that 
conceived in Snook because there was no finding in that case that the tenants had shared in the 
landlord’s intention not to rely on Clause 16.35 Instead, it was emphasised that tenants typically 
 
27 Street [1985] AC 809, 819. 
28 Bright analysed Street as a ‘labelling’ case that fell within the ambit of the internal route: see S Bright, ‘Avoiding 
Tenancy Legislation: Sham and Contracting Out Revisited’ (2002) 61 CLJ 146, 159. 
29 Street [1985] AC 809, 823. 
30 ibid, 825. 
31 Antoniades v Villiers [1990] 1 AC 417 (‘Antoniades’).  
32 Antoniades [1990] 1 AC 417, 463. 
33 ibid. 
34 Antoniades [1990] 1 AC 417, 467. 
35 Bright also observed that ‘Lord Templeman was seeking [in Antoniades v Villiers] to develop a flexible 
doctrine, free from the constraints of the Snook definition of sham, that would apply whenever an agreement has 
been artificially structured so as to be tantamount to contracting out of the Rent Acts’. See S Bright, ‘Beyond 
Sham and into Pretence’ (1991) 11 OJLS 136, 139–40. See further B MacFarlane and E Simpson, ‘Tackling 
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had no real choice in the inclusion of such clauses because ‘[a] person seeking residential 
accommodation may sign a document couched in any language in order to obtain shelter’.36 
Moreover, the pretence that was operative in Antoniades also differed from Snook shams in 
that it related only to a particular term of the contract rather than the validity of the agreement 
as a whole. 
Subsequent courts that found the Snook constraints obstructive welcomed the flexibility 
inherent in the broader notion of ‘pretence’. In Bankway Properties Ltd v Pensfold-Dunsford, 
Arden LJ explained Antoniades as an application of the doctrine of pretence, a ‘variant’ of the 
Snook sham.37 This doctrine, according to Arden LJ, applies where the court has to resolve an 
issue by discovering ‘the substance and reality of the transaction entered into by the parties’.38 
For that purpose, it may look at all relevant circumstances, including subsequent conduct, but 
proof of a common intention to deceive is not needed.39 Applying the doctrine to the facts, 
Arden LJ struck down as a pretence a rent review clause that purported to increase the rent to 
more than five-fold after two years.40 It was not a genuine provision for fixing rent but a mere 
‘device’ to enable the landlord to repossess the leased premises otherwise than in accordance 
with the statutory scheme of the Housing Act 1988 (UK).41 
The decisions in Antoniades and Bankway are clear instances of substantive reasoning, 
motivated by the desire to give effect to relevant legislative policies. In Antoniades, Lord 
 
Avoidance’ in J Getzler (ed), Rationalizing Property, Equity and Trusts: Essays in Honour of Edward Burn 
(London, LexisNexis, 2003) 152. 
36 Antoniades [1990] 1 AC 417, 458. 
37 Bankway Properties Ltd v Pensfold-Dunsford [2001] EWCA Civ 528, [2001] 1 WLR 1369 [43] (‘Bankway’). 
The distinction between ‘pretence’ and ‘sham’ was accepted by the Court of Appeal in the earlier cases of Aslan 
v Murphy (Nos 1 and 2) and Duke v Wynne [1990] 1 WLR 766, 770–71. 
38 Bankway [2001] EWCA Civ 528, [2001] 1 WLR 1369 [43]. 
39 ibid, [44]. 
40 Pill LJ, however, analysed the issue using the ‘internal’ route. He found that the terms of the lease evinced a 
clear intention to create an assured tenancy and thereby to grant long-term security. The rent review clause, which 
has the effect of precipitating early termination, was ‘inconsistent with and repugnant’ to that main purpose and 
ought therefore be ignored: Bankway [2001] EWCA Civ 528, [2001] 1 WLR 1369 [66]–[70]. For a criticism of 
this reasoning, see Bright, above n 2828, 166. 
41 Bankway [2001] EWCA Civ 528, [2001] 1 WLR 1369 [55]. Her Ladyship based this conclusion on three 
findings: the absence of any evidence that the parties had even negotiated the rent-review clause; that the increased 
rent well exceeded the market rate and was clearly beyond the means of the defendants or other persons likely to 
rent in the same location; and that the landlord had taken no action to demand the higher rent when it could have 
done so: see Bankway [2001] EWCA Civ 528, [2001] 1 WLR 1369 [53], [54], [60]. 
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Templeman prefaced his discussion with the declaration that ‘Parties to an agreement cannot 
contract out of the Rent Acts; if they were able to do so the Acts would be a dead letter because 
in a state of housing shortage a person seeking residential accommodation may agree to 
anything to obtain shelter’. 42  This ready acceptance of an implicit prohibition against 
‘contracting out’ underscores the primacy of the legislative objective – the protection of a 
vulnerable class. It affirmed, as did Arden LJ in Bankway,43 that the disparate bargaining 
powers (then) inherent in landlord and tenant relationships warranted closer scrutiny of, and 
interference with, contractual arrangements. The broad latitude within which landlords could 
draft and dictate contractual terms necessitated that courts be equipped with an equally 
responsive tool to detect more subtle and indirect ways of circumventing statutory protection 
for tenants. A narrow sham doctrine in the Snook sense did not adequately meet this purpose. 
Those who are uncomfortable with the uncertainty that resides in such an approach have, 
unsurprisingly, agitated over the difficulty of justifying these ‘anomalous’ cases in doctrinal 
terms.44 On one view, they may be seen as manifestations of the general principle that courts 
may disregard terms conceived for purely avoidance motives, viz, where they were 
incorporated into the contract for no purpose other than to avoid a particular mandatory 
regulatory regime.45 But this explanation is unsatisfactory as it is well established that an 
avoidance motive is not, by itself, a sufficient reason for striking down a contract or a term.46 
An alternative explanation is that pretence is simply a wider concept of sham in that a contract 
or an obligation could be regarded as ‘not genuine’ if there was no intention to enforce or rely 
on it.47 Yet this, too, is flawed since contracting parties may always legitimately form an 
intention of non-enforcement for reasons of benevolence rather than deception or 
 
42 Antoniades [1990] 1 AC 417, 458. His Lordship also cited (463) Street as authority for reasserting the principle 
that parties cannot contract out of the Rents Act. 
43 Bankway [2001] EWCA Civ 528, [2001] 1 WLR 1369 [45], citing Lord Simon in Johnson v Moreton [1980] 
AC 37, 66–67. 
44 Bright, Glover and Prassl, above n 25, 110. 
45 Antoniades [1990] 1 AC 417, 462, 463. Bright thus explicated the case as having laid down the rule that ‘if a 
non-exclusive occupation clause is inserted as a pretence and is not intended to be relied upon, that this is an 
attempt to contract out of the Rent Acts and so cannot be allowed’. See Bright, above n 35, 141. 
46 Thus, Megarry J observed in Miles v Bull [1969] 1 QB 258, 264 that ‘a transaction is no sham merely because 
it is carried out with a particular purpose or object. If what is done is genuinely done, it does not remain undone 
merely because there was an ulterior purpose in doing it’. See also McFarlane and Simpson, above n 35, 158. 
47 Bright, above n 28, 157, citing Neuberger J in National Westminster Bank plc v Jones [2001] EWCA Civ 1541, 
[2001] 1 BCLC 98 [45]. 
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contrivance.48 Once the requirement for common intention (to deceive) is abandoned, it is also 
unclear what threshold conduct would justify the finding of a ‘non-genuine’ term.49  
These concerns reflect the anxiety that is commonly experienced when substantive reasons 
are prioritised over formal ones. The flexibility that enables courts to respond to varying 
avoidance tactics inevitably undermines predictability. To some degree, such instability may 
be mitigated if courts react consistently to a recurrent fact pattern so that a formal rule is 
eventually recognised to govern that situation, but even so, the rigid application of such a rule 
regardless of context could lead to questionable outcomes. In Swan v Uecker,50 the Supreme 
Court of Victoria held that a tenant had ‘sublet’ the rented premises when he offered it for 
short-term occupation through Airbnb. Under Victorian residential tenancy law, subletting 
without the landlord’s consent is a ground upon which the landlord may evict the tenants. 
Notwithstanding that the Airbnb agreement was labelled as a licence, Croft J found it 
constituted a lease because its terms granted exclusive possession to Airbnb guests. This was 
a surprising outcome as it runs counter to the common perception that such short-term home-
sharing arrangements are no more than mere licences. At its heart, the case is concerned with 
a tenant’s security of tenure, whether eviction rights should be restrictively construed, and the 
extent to which a tenant’s right to quiet enjoyment extended to a right to participate in the 
sharing economy.51 By adopting a formalistic approach that focused narrowly on the test of 
‘exclusive possession’, the Court effectively sidestepped these substantive concerns and 
arrived at an inadequately-considered outcome. The surprising outcome highlights the 
centrality of policy considerations even in cases where the issue hinges on an apparently stable 
rule (such as the ‘exclusive possession’ test).  
VI. EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS 
Like tenants, employees constitute a vulnerable group that is statutorily protected against 
exploitation and unfair treatment. A person who qualifies as an ‘employee’ will therefore enjoy 
particular protections such as the right to redundancy payments and the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed,52 while a ‘worker’ is entitled (inter alia) to minimum wage and protections for 
working overtime.53 In practice, employers who wish to avoid these additional burdens may, 
 
48 McFarlane and Simpson, above n 35, 160–61. 
49 Bright, Glover and Prassl, above n 25, 114. 
50 Swan v Uecker [2016] VSC 313, (2016) 50 VR 74. 
51 See the criticisms of B Swannie, ‘Trouble in Paradise: Are Home Sharing Arrangements “Subletting” under 
Residential Tenancies Legislation’ (2016) 25 Australian Property Law Journal 183. 
52 Employment Rights Act 1996 (UK), ss 135, 94.  
53 National Minimum Wage Act 1998 (UK); Working Time Regulations 1998 (SI 1988/1833) (UK). 
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in a contract of appointment, explicitly exclude the indicia of employment so as to ensure that 
the relationship falls outside the ambit of the relevant statutory protections. Where, however, 
there is evidence that such attempts are a matter only of form and bear no relation to reality, 
the question would arise as to whether the agreement is in truth one of employment. 
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to look behind the parties’ written contracts in the 
employment context.54 Close adherence to contractual orthodoxy meant that parol evidence is 
generally inadmissible in construing the contract of appointment. Hence, a contract that 
explicitly excludes salient features of employment (such as control or the obligation to provide 
personal service) would be given effect to even if there were evidence that the term was not 
enforced.55 Moreover, the Snook doctrine is not usually of assistance in this context since the 
contracts are typically drafted by the employer and signed by the putative employee on a ‘take-
it-or-leave-it’ basis so the latter can hardly be said to have been complicit in the employer’s 
‘deception’. 
More recently, however, a new approach emphasising substance over form has evolved in 
recognition of the power imbalance inherent in employment relations. In Consistent Group Ltd 
v Mrs Kalwak,56 Elias J upheld a tribunal decision that a group of Polish workers who had 
contracted with an employment agency ostensibly as ‘sub-contractors’ were in fact employees. 
Although the contract contained various explicit denials of employment relations (by, for 
example, providing for the right to refuse work and to provide substitute service), these 
provisions were shams as they did not reflect reality. Explaining why it was crucial to look 
behind written contracts to discern the parties’ true agreement, Elias J astutely observed: 
The concern to which tribunals must be alive is that armies of lawyers will simply place 
substitution clauses, or clauses denying any obligation to accept or provide for work in the 
employment contracts, as a matter of form, even where such terms do not begin to reflect the 
real relationship.57 
These observations point to the real risk of employers depriving workers and employees of 
their statutory protection simply by creating a documentary fiction of self-employment. 
 
54 See ACL Davies, ‘Employment Law’ in E Simpson and M Stewart (eds), Sham Transactions (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2013) paras 10.25–10.30.  
55 See, eg, Express & Echo Publications Ltd v Tanton [1999] ICR 693, 697, where a finding of an employment 
relationship by the Employment Appeal Tribunal was overturned because the Tribunal judge placed too much 
weight on ‘what actually happened’ rather than what the legal obligations were. 
56 Consistent Group Ltd v Mrs Kalwak EAT/0535/2006 (‘Consistent’). 
57 Consistent EAT/0535/2006 [57]. 
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Elias J’s decision was reversed on appeal,58 but his reasoning was subsequently endorsed in 
Firthglow Ltd v Szilagyi.59 In this case, the English Court of Appeal held that a claimant who 
had contracted as a ‘partnership’ was in fact employed by the defendant. Under the 
arrangement, the claimant (Szilagyi) was required to form a partnership with another, and the 
partnership in turn contracted to supply services to the defendant, Protectacoat. The service 
agreement provided, inter alia, that Protectacoat was under no obligation to provide the 
partnership with work. The undisputed purpose of these arrangements was to ensure that 
Szilagyi would not become an employee of Protectacoat. Eventually, a dispute arose and the 
arrangements were terminated.  
Szilagyi brought proceedings in the Employment Tribunal for unfair dismissal. A 
preliminary issue that arose was whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the case, which 
turned on whether Szilagyi was an employee of the company. The Court of Appeal affirmed 
the Tribunal’s decision that an employment relationship existed because both the partnership 
and service agreements were shams. Smith LJ, who delivered the principal judgment, was 
emphatic that ‘the test for a sham must be sensitive to the context’.60 Her Ladyship accepted 
that a broader test (than Snook) is justified in the employment context where contractual terms 
are not usually negotiated but dictated by the employer.61 So, rather than insist on a common 
intention to deceive a third party,62 the right approach is simply to consider whether the written 
contract represents the parties’ true intentions. What that means is that ‘If the evidence 
establishes that the true relation was, and was intended to be, different from what is described 
in the document, then it is that relationship and not the document or the document alone which 
defines the contract’.63 Applying these principles to the facts, the Court was satisfied that an 
employment relationship existed between the parties. No true partnership existed between 
Szilagyi and his assistants since they did not operate a common business for profit.64 The 
parties’ actual conduct further confirmed that Protectacoat had significant control over 
Szilagyi,65 and that mutuality of obligations was implicit in their agreement.66  
 
58 Consistent Group Ltd v Mrs Kalwak [2008] EWCA Civ 430, [2008] IRLR 505. 
59 Firthglow Ltd (trading as Protectacoat) v Szilagyi [2009] EWCA Civ 98, [2009] ICR 835 [54] (‘Firthglow’). 
60 Firthglow [2009] EWCA Civ 98, [2009] ICR 835 [42]. 
61 ibid, [52]. 
62 ibid [53]. 
63 ibid [56]. 
64 ibid [63]. 
65 ibid [59]. 
66 ibid [67]. 
 
 14 
SMU Classification: Restricted 
Together, the approach of Elias J in Consistent and that of Smith LJ in Firthglow marked a 
trend towards greater worker-protection that has since been vindicated by the Supreme Court 
in Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher.67 Autoclenz concerned a claim by a group of valeters that they were 
‘workers’ entitled to minimum wage under relevant wage protection regulations.68 The valeters 
were engaged by the respondent company (Autoclenz) to provide car cleaning services. 
Although the contracts described the valeters as self-employed independent contractors and 
contained the usual rights to substitute and refuse work, the UK Supreme Court held that the 
claimants were workers for the purposes of the National Minimum Wage Regulations 1999 
(UK). Delivering the sole judgment of the Court, Lord Clarke unhesitatingly adopted the wider 
notion of ‘sham’ advocated by Elias J in Consistent.69 In his view, the Snook definition was 
‘too narrow’,70 and not the only route by which the courts may disregard a term of the written 
contract.71 That employment relations are distinguished by unequal bargaining power justifies 
greater skepticism in assessing the genuineness of the written terms. Lord Clarke summed up 
this ‘purposive approach’ as follows: 
[T]he relative bargaining power of the parties must be taken into account in deciding whether 
the terms of any written agreement in truth represent what was agreed and the true agreement 
will often have to be gleaned from all the circumstances of the case, of which the written 
agreement is only a part.72  
Autoclenz now stands as high authority for the proposition that a court may recharacterise a 
contract on the basis of sham analysis even if the conditions of Snook are not satisfied. It is a 
clear instance of substantive reasoning at work, where the Court readily departed from standard 
contractual doctrines (by admitting evidence of the parties’ subsequent conduct and 
disregarding the signature rule73) in order to give effect to legislative policy. Alan Bogg has 
sought to rationalise such departure as a special contractual doctrine that is ‘attuned to the 
distinctiveness of the personal employment contract’.74 On that view, the identification of ‘true 
agreement’ in Autoclenz could be explained as a type of contextual interpretation based on an 
expanded view of the principles set out in Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich 
Building Society.75 That would involve ‘a more aggressive form of contextualism in the context 
 
67 Davies, above n 54, para 10.31; Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41, [2011] 4 All ER 745 (‘Autoclenz’). 
68 Viz, National Minimum Wage Regulations 1999 (UK) and Working Time Regulations 1998 (UK). 
69 Autoclenz [2011] UKSC 41, [2011] 4 All ER 745 [29]. 
70 ibid [28]. 
71 ibid [23]. 
72 ibid [35]. 
73 L’Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394.  
74 A Bogg, ‘Sham Self-Employment in the Supreme Court’ (2012) 41 Industrial Law Journal 328, 331. 
75 ibid 336–39; Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896. cf the 
argument of Bright, Glover and Prassl in the tenancy context that the ICS principles cannot explain the pretence 
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of personal employment contracts’,76 that allows courts recourse to evidence of ‘how the 
parties conducted themselves in practice and what their expectations of each other were’.77 By 
this means, Bogg sought to bring Autoclenz back within the fold of doctrinal (and formal) 
analysis but its effect is to elide the distinct processes of interpretation and characterisation 
with the risk of reducing the test of characterisation to one of parties’ intention and suppressing 
the proper analysis of substantive, policy considerations. 
Rather than force-fitting the decision within the strictures of contractual doctrines, 
Autoclenz is better defended on substantive grounds. The Court was not there concerned with 
the construction of contract per se but with the broader issue of avoidance.78 The issue at hand 
was not simply what the terms of the contract meant, but whether the employer could 
legitimately devise a ‘fake’ self-employment to evade its statutory obligations. That inquiry 
necessarily requires the court to discern the parties’ true agreement in order to establish if an 
evasive scheme exists in the first place, and (if it does) then to determine if the scheme is 
permissible having regard to the legislative policies. The latter is inevitably a normative inquiry 
which the court must undertake within the confines of legislative objectives. 
VII. TRUSTS 
Given the widespread use of the trust as an asset-protection mechanism, it is unsurprising that 
attempts are occasionally made to invalidate trust settlements as ‘shams’ devised to shield 
assets from creditors, former spouses and tax authorities. Increasingly, these settlements are 
structured as discretionary trusts, so that the settlor could be said to have no proprietary interest 
in the trust assets even if he is named as a potential beneficiary. In this context, as in others, 
the courts have employed the Snook definition of sham. A trust document is a sham if it is not 
intended to have the legal effects that it purports to create. A classic instance is Abdel Rahman 
v Chase Bank (CI) Trust Company Limited,79 where the Royal Court of Jersey was prepared to 
 
‘doctrine' as they are only applicable when ambiguity subsists in the contractual terms: see Bright, Glover and 
Prassl, above n 25, para 6.36.  
76 Bogg, above n 74, 339. 
77 Autoclenz [2011] UKSC 41, [2011] 4 All ER 745 [30], citing Smith LJ in Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2008] 
EWCA Civ 1172, [2010] IRLR 70 [53]. 
78 As Davies cogently observes, courts are justified in taking a more astute approach in tackling ‘fake’ self-
employment arrangements as they are, in substance, attempts to contract out mandatory employment regulations: 
Davies, above n 54, para 10.43.  
79 Abdel Rahman v Chase Bank (CI) Trust Company Limited [1991] JLR 103 (‘Abdel Rahman’). 
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invalidate a trust settlement that reserved significant powers to the settlor,80 because the settlor 
had ‘exercised dominion and control over the trustee in the management and administration of 
the settlement … [and] treated the assets comprised in the trust fund as his own and the trustee 
as though it were his mere agent and nominee’.81 The settlement was a sham ‘in the sense that 
it was made to appear to be a genuine gift when it was not’.82 
Unlike tenancy and employment agreements, trusts may be constituted unilaterally but that 
has not persuaded courts to adopt a wider concept of sham than that defined in Snook. Despite 
some dicta to the contrary,83 the prevailing view appears to be that a trust that is prima facie 
validly constituted can only be struck down as a sham upon proof that the settlor and trustee(s) 
shared a common intention to mislead another,84 although a reckless indifference as to the 
genuineness of the transaction could count as requisite intention.85 Conaglen has defended the 
strict application of Snook in this context.86 He argues that Snook shams are manifestations of 
a doctrine distinct from that of construction, which ‘permits the court to step outside the normal 
process of construction, and to consider evidence of the subjective intention of the parties 
which show that the arrangements that they put in place were a façade or disguise’.87 On this 
 
80 The settlement was stated to be discretionary but provided, inter alia, that the settlor may without the consent 
of the trustee appoint up to one-third of the trust fund and its income over a 12-month period; that the trustee 
could at its absolute discretion pay or apply the whole or part of the capital of the trust fund to the settlor or for 
his benefit and in so doing shall have regard exclusively to the settlor’s interests; that the powers to invest, to 
change the law of the settlement, to delegate and to change trustees were all to be exercised either with the sanction 
of the settlor or in accordance with his instruction: see Abdel Rahman [1991] JLR 103, 140–46.  
81 Abdel Rahman [1991] JLR 103, 147. 
82 ibid. 
83 See, eg, Midland Bank plc v Wyatt [1997] 1 BCLC 242, 245; Minwalla v Minwalla [2004] EWHC 2823 (Fam), 
[2005] 1 FLR 771 [53]–[55]; Carmen v Yates [2004] EWHC 3448 (Ch), [2005] BPIR 476 [218]; Ali v Bashir 
[2014] EWHC 3853 (Ch) [26].  
84 See Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637, [2005] 2 WLR 1213 [190]; A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam), [2007] 2 
FLR 467 [38]–[40]; JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Sergei Viktorovich Pugachev [2017] EWHC 
2426 [150] (‘Pugachev’). cf Painter v Hutchison [2007] EWHC 758 [114]–[115] where Lewison J confined the 
requirement for common intention to cases of bilateral trusts. 
85 In re Esteem Settlement [2003] JLR 188 [58]; A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) [52]; Pugachev [2017] EWHC 
2426 [150], [435]. 
86 M Conaglen, ‘Sham Trusts’ [2008] 67 CLJ 176; M Conaglen, ‘Trusts and Intention’ in E Simpson and M 
Stewart (eds), Sham Transactions (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013). 
87 Conaglen, ‘Trusts and Intention’, above n 86, 125. 
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view, it is the intention to deceive that lies at the heart of sham reasoning.88 For that reason, 
courts are justified to depart from the objective approach to construction and look, instead, to 
the parties’ subjective state of mind.  
This explanation has influenced the jurisprudence on sham trusts in New Zealand,89 and one 
can see the obvious force of the suggestion that shams have much to do with deliberate attempts 
to present a misleading front. Nevertheless, it does not logically or necessarily follow that 
shams as defined in Snook bears the status of a ‘doctrine’ that is of universal application.90 As 
we have just seen in the context of tenancy and especially that of employment, courts have 
been prepared to adopt broader notions of ‘sham’ where the context justifies doing so. While 
it is true that Snook shams would often be the most flagrant examples of illegitimate 
avoidances, it is not obvious that the Snook criteria are the only criteria relevant for detecting 
shams in all contexts. Nor is it always the case that an agreement or a term would be disregarded 
only because it does not reflect reality.91 Ultimately, the question whether a transaction should 
be set aside as a sham is assessed not only by legal doctrines but also by the intensity of the 
substantive policy reasons relevant to the context. 
For trusts, the key policy consideration that has shaped judicial preference for a restrictive 
conception of shams is the need to preserve commercial certainty. As Robertson J 
acknowledged in Official Assignee v Wilson: ‘A court will only look behind a transaction’s 
ostensible validity if there is good reason to do so, and “good reason” is a high threshold, since 
a premium is placed on commercial certainty’.92 This ‘premium’ on commercial certainty is 
especially needed to protect two specific groups – the trustee and the beneficiaries – who would 
 
88 Conaglen, ‘Sham Trusts’, above n 86, 186–87. 
89 Official Assignee v Wilson [2008] NZCA 122, [2008] 3 NZLR 45 (‘Wilson’). 
90 MacFarlane and Simpson, above n 35, 139. 
91 See the interesting Canadian case 1524994 Ontario Ltd v Canada [2007] FCJ No 234 [20] where the Ontario 
Federal Court of Appeal held that an arrangement contrived to circumvent the strict rules regulating insurable 
audiological services must be regarded as representing the true economic reality for taxation purposes even though 
the arrangement was in fact a contractual fiction intended to misrepresent a legal relationship. The principle, 
Décary JA explained, is that ‘Where a taxpayer has created a fiction and has lived by it, his fiction has become its 
real economic world, for better and for worse, plus GST’. 
92 Wilson [2008] NZCA 122, [2008] 3 NZLR 45 [52]. 
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in all likelihood act in reliance on the trust. A formal, doctrinal approach to sham reasoning 
would protect honest trustees from liability,93 as well as the beneficiaries’ security of receipt.94  
But whilst important, commercial certainty does not exhaust the policy considerations 
relevant to trusts law. An obvious countervailing concern is the need to deter abuses of trust 
structures, which in recent years has sparked the judicial recognition of ‘illusory trusts’. In 
Clayton v Clayton,95 the Supreme Court of New Zealand accepted (obiter) that a trust that is 
honestly intended by the settlor (and hence not a sham) may still fail as an ‘illusory trust’,96 
either because the settlor had reserved so much power to himself that he could not be said to 
have divested sufficient control to constitute a trust, or the breadth of the powers vested in the 
settlor calls into question the irreducible core of the trustee’s duties set out in Armitage v 
Nurse.97 The question whether a trust fails on this ground is a matter of construction of the trust 
deed. So, unlike a sham, an ‘illusory’ trust is ‘not about deception, but self-contradiction that 
is apparent on the face of the trust deed’.98 In JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v 
 
93 This concern was, eg, implicit in A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) [79], [86] where Munby J emphasised that 
‘there is not a shred of evidence to justify a finding of “sham” against “four professional men”’. See also A See, 
‘Revisiting Sham Trusts: Common Intention, Estoppel and Illegality’ [2018] Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 
31, 36.  
94 As evidenced, eg, by Rimer J’s reasoning for insisting on ‘common intention’ in Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 
1637, [2005] 2 WLR 1213 [190]: ‘One might as well say that an apparently outright gift made by a donor can 
subsequently be held to be a sham on the basis of some unspoken intention by the donor not to part with the 
property in it. But if the donee accepted the gift on the footing that it was a genuine gift, the donor’s undeclared 
intentions cannot turn an ostensibly valid disposition of his property into no disposition at all. To set that sort of 
case up the donee must also be shown to be a party to the alleged sham.’  
95 Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29, [2016] 1 NZLR 551 [123] (‘Clayton’).  
96 Though the Court rejected the ‘illusory’ label since it has no value except to describe a trust that has failed: see 
Clayton [2016] NZSC 29, [2016] 1 NZLR 551 [123], [129]. See also Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 [169]. This 
chapter will, however, continue to use the term as a convenient shorthand for a trust that fails by reason of the 
excessively wide powers reserved by the settlor. 
97 Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241. See Clayton [2016] NZSC 29, [2016] 1 NZLR 551 [124]. The case concerned 
a dispute over the division of matrimonial property. A large part of Mr Clayton’s property was settled under 
various trusts and Mrs Clayton sought to argue that these assets were ‘relationship property’ to which she was 
entitled under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (NZ). The Supreme Court disposed of the issue on the ground 
that the trust assets fell within the definition of ‘relationship property’ by reason of the general power of 
appointment vested in Mr Clayton. As such, it did not have to determine the true rationale of ‘illusory trusts’: see 
Clayton [2016] NZSC 29, [2016] 1 NZLR 551 [127].  
98 L Ho, ‘“Breaking Bad”—Settlors’ Reserved Powers’ in R Nolan, K Low and HW Tang (eds), Trusts and 
Modern Wealth Management (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018) 45. 
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Sergei Viktorovich Pugachev,99 Birss J in the English High Court adopted this reasoning to 
invalidate several discretionary trusts. The significant features of this case were that the settlor 
was not only a named beneficiary under the discretionary trusts but also their protector. In his 
capacity as protector, he could exercise extensive powers,100 selfishly for his own benefit, the 
effect of which was to ‘allow him to retain complete control over the assets he had settled in 
the trusts’.101 Consequently, the trust deeds did not have the effect of divesting the settlor of 
the beneficial ownership of the trust assets. 
Pugachev is controversial as its correctness has been doubted.102 Specifically, it has been 
criticised for suggesting that a trust may fail by reason of extensive settlor control even if the 
trustee remains accountable to the beneficiaries,103 and continues to exercise real discretion in 
the administration of the trust.104 Such an approach conflates the distinct concepts of power 
and property,105 and threatens to unsettle even trusts that reserve wide powers to settlors for 
legitimate reasons.106 But even if one accepts these criticisms as cogent, it does not necessarily 
follow that the case was wrongly decided. Rather, these doctrinal lapses point to the substantive 
reasons that underpin the decision. So, despite Birss J’s attempt to couch his reasoning in 
formal (doctrinal) terms (by invoking the authority of Clayton and stressing the objective, 
interpretive nature of the inquiry),107  his Lordship’s interpretation of the trust deeds was 
ultimately coloured by the perception that the settlor had established the trusts principally to 
 
99 Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426.  
100 The protector had the power to veto all major decisions regarding investment, distribution of income or capital 
and variation of the deed, had the right to appoint new beneficiaries, to appoint a successor in the event that he is 
barred by a (legal) disability from acting, and was free to remove a trustee who did not act in accordance with his 
wishes: see Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 [236]–[ 244]. 
101 Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 [245]. 
102 See J Davies, ‘New Developments in Settlor Reserved Powers’ [2018] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 175; 
J Brightwell and L Richardson, ‘Mezhprom v Pugachev: Bold New Approach or Illusory Development?’ (2018) 
24 Trusts & Trustees 398.  
103 cf Re AQ Revocable Trust [2010] Bda LR 26. 
104 And so is not a mere agent or nominee. 
105 Re Armstrong (1886) 17 QBD 521, 531.  
106 G Hogan, ‘Case Note: Mezhprom Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch)’ (2018) 24 Trusts & Trustees 
212, 214–15. 
107 Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 [166]–[168]. 
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ring-fence his assets against creditors.108 This context featured prominently in his Lordship’s 
analysis of the settlor-protector’s powers. In deciding that the settlor-protector’s powers were 
personal (evidencing control) rather than fiduciary (negating control) in nature, Birss J was 
categorical that a court should not lend its assistance to an ‘unscrupulous person’,109 who tried 
to conceal his beneficial ownership of property by using a trust deed to vest unfettered powers 
on himself as protector so as to defeat the claims of creditors.110  
To sum up, the current English approach to recharacterisation in the area of trusts is marked 
by a discernibly formal approach to the sham ‘doctrine’, while a more intricate interplay of 
form and substance is observable in the nascent development of illusory trusts. A court 
confronting an alleged illusory trust will typically utilise formal reasoning as the starting point 
to keep faith with precedents and promote legal certainty but is willing to employ substantive 
reasoning to bridge the gap when it perceives existing rules to be deficient in deterring the 
abuse of trust structures as an avoidance device. Overall, however, judicial preference for 
formal reasoning would mean that substantive reasons are accorded only a subsidiary role in 
rationalising particular outcomes. In Pugachev, Birss J’s attempt to present the outcome as an 
application of an exercise in ‘construction’ premised on strong judicial authority,111 did not 
ultimately conceal the judge’s concern for protecting creditors, but it is conceivable that the 
leaning in favour of formal reasoning may occasionally undermine a decision by obscuring 
pertinent policy considerations.  
VIII. FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS 
Attempts to recharacterise financing agreements are typically made to secure priorities in the 
event of the debtor’s insolvency. Although it is clear that such transactions may be set aside 
upon proof of Snook shams,112 the ‘internal’ route or ‘construction’ method is more commonly 
employed as parties entering into financing agreements do usually intend to perform the terms 
agreed.113 In so far as this approach is understood as a process of objective interpretation aimed 
 
108 There was evidence that the settlor had engaged the services of a consultancy firm specifically to defend his 
assets against Russian creditors and that the settlor’s powers as protector were designed to be judgment proof: see 
Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 [23], [275].  
109 Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 [182]. 
110 ibid [187]. 
111 And such reasoning is therefore formal in appearance: see M Bennett, ‘Trusts law—Form over Substance or 
Substance over form?’ (Obligations IX Conference, Melbourne, July 2018). 
112 See, eg, Re Watson (1890) 25 QBD 27.  
113 D Neuberger, ‘Company Charges’ in E Simpson and M Stewart (eds), Sham Transactions (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2013) para 9.04.  
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at discovering the ‘intention of the parties’, it is formal in appearance. In general, however, this 
approach has not (but with notable exception)114 resulted in formalistic reasoning as English 
courts are often cognizant of the policy factors at play.   
The leading cases of Brumark and In re Spectrum Plus Ltd, on the characterisation of 
company charges usefully illustrate this policy-informed process.115 Both cases attest to the 
important principle that the categorisation of a charge is a question of law not dictated by 
parties’ contractual labels. In Brumark, the Privy Council held that a purported ‘fixed’ charge 
over uncollected book debts was a floating charge as the chargor was at liberty to use the 
proceeds of the debts. The decision confirmed that contracting parties are not free to make 
whatever agreements they like.116 Brumark was followed a few years later by Spectrum Plus. 
Adopting Lord Millett’s exposition of legal categorisation,117 the House of Lords held that a 
mislabelled ‘fixed’ charge over book debts was in substance a floating charge as the chargor 
could freely draw on the proceeds of the receivables. The parties’ declared intention or label 
may be relevant but is not conclusive.118 While the reasoning in both cases proceeded largely 
on a formal basis by identifying the chargee’s control as the defining feature of a fixed charge, 
the Courts clearly also took into account policy factors militating against an exclusively 
contractual approach. In Spectrum Plus, Lord Scott highlighted the need to keep in mind the 
legislative imperative to preserve preference creditors’ priority over the floating chargee in the 
event of insolvency as the common law develops the concept of ‘floating charge’.119 Likewise, 
Lord Walker observed, after noting the parallel with the lease/licence distinction drawn in 
Street, that there is ‘public interest’ in ‘ensuring that preferential creditors obtain the measure 
of protection which Parliament intended them to have’.120 
Transactions involving title financing are another fertile ground that breeds problems of 
characterisation. Hire purchase, sale and leasebacks and retention of titles are common 
examples of such transactions. Unlike cases on charges, the judicial approach to this category 
of transactions has sometimes been criticised for placing too much weight on parties’ express 
intention (and hence formalistic). Welsh Development is a case in point. There, the English 
Court of Appeal had to decide if a complex receivables financing arrangement that was 
 
114 See PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v OW Bunker Malta Ltd [2016] UKSC 23, [2016] AC 1034, discussed below, 
text accompanying nn 129–37. 
115 Brumark [2001] UKPC 28, [2001] 2 AC 710; In re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] UKHL 41, [2005] 2 AC 680 
(‘Spectrum Plus’).  
116 Overruling In re New Bullas Trading [1994] 1 BCLC 485. 
117 Spectrum Plus [2005] UKHL 41, [2005] 2 AC 680 [141]. 
118 ibid [80], [119], [141]. 
119 ibid [98]. 
120 ibid [141]. 
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structured as a sale should be recharacterised as a secured loan. The Court upheld the parties’ 
characterisation. In its reasoning, the Court reiterated the need to look at the ‘substance’ of the 
agreement but went on to locate ‘substance’ largely in the ‘language’ of the agreement.121 
Indeed, the deference to form seemed complete when Dillon LJ approvingly cited Lord 
Wilberforce in Lloyd’s & Scottish Ltd v Cyril Lord Carpet Sales Ltd to the effect that ‘[it] 
would be a strange doctrine of “looking for the substance” or “looking through the documents” 
which would produce a contractual intention so clearly negated by the documents and by oral 
evidence’.122 ‘Substance’ is therefore equated with parties’ intention,123 so their choice of legal 
category would (save in the rare case of a sham) generally prevail.124  
Prioritising form over substance is not, however, formalistic or objectionable if there are 
good substantive reasons so to do. In this context, the main reason for respecting the selected 
form is the recognition that parties should generally be free to finance their trades through 
sales.125 That this was a highly germane consideration in Welsh Development is evident in 
Dillon LJ’s observation that: 
The crux of this point, as I see it, is that the parties were entitled to choose the way in which 
Parrot would raise finance. There was nothing illegal about it. It could be raised either by 
borrowing or by the sale of assets, whether goods or book debts.126 
 
121 Welsh Development [1992] BCLC 148, 161–62.   
122 Welsh Development [1992] BCLC 148, 168; Lloyd’s & Scottish Ltd v Cyril Lord Carpet Sales Ltd [1992] 
BCLC 609, 615. 
123 See A Berg, ‘Recharacterisation after Enron’ [2003] Journal of Business Law 205, 218. 
124 Or, as Millett LJ summed up in Orion [1996] 2 BCLC 78, 85: ‘The legal classification of a transaction is not, 
therefore, approached by the court in vacuo. The question is not what the transaction is but whether it is in truth 
what it purports to be. Unless the documents taken as a whole compel a different conclusion, the transaction which 
they embody should be categorised in conformity with the intention which the parties have expressed in them.’ 
125 See also F Oditah, ‘Financing Trade Credit: Welsh Development Agency v Exfinco’ [1992] Journal of Business 
Law 541, 541–43. The commercial reasons that may justify a sale structure would include the trader’s borrowing 
limits, its gearing ratio, whether consents are required for creating further debt or security, restrictions by way of 
cross-default or negative pledge provisions in existing debt instruments, whether off-balance results are desired 
and whether registration would damage the trader’s credit. 
126 Welsh Development [1992] BCLC 148, 168. 
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As such, a genuine finance sale would not usually be recharacterised as a loan simply because 
it has the economic effects of a loan.127 Courts would only countenance recharacterisation if 
there are sound policy reasons to justify the reallocation of contractual risks.128  
From this cursory account, it will appear that the judicial technique employed in this context 
is a prima facie formal one: the characterisation of a transaction is determined by construing 
the document to determine if its intended effects are consistent with the features of a particular 
legal category. In practice, however, courts do take into account policy factors that may favour 
one construction over another though such considerations are usually presented as subsidiary 
or supplemental justifications for outcomes derived by the process of objective construction. 
Often, this ‘blended’ approach would allow courts to adequately weigh and mediate divergent 
policy interests. Yet, the (often unconscious) subordination of substantive reasons implicit in 
such an approach may, on occasion, so stifle or obscure relevant social or economic goals as 
to render a decision insensible in its context. 
A poignant example is found in the perplexing decision of PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v 
OW Bunker Malta Ltd.129 In this case, the owners of the Res Cogitans had contracted to 
purchase bunkers from the OWB group (‘OWB’) subject to a retention of title (‘ROT’) clause. 
OWB, in turn, obtained the bunker from other suppliers who physically delivered the bunkers 
to the vessel. When OWB became insolvent, the owners (fearing it might be liable twice over 
to both OWB and the physical suppliers) sought declarations that it was not liable to pay OWB 
the price of the bunkers. It argued that since the transaction was a sale subject to the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 (UK) (‘SOGA’), OWB could only maintain an action for price under section 
49 SOGA if the property in the bunkers had first vested in the owners. On the facts, this 
condition was not satisfied since the property in the bunkers had been consumed without 
property having first passed to the owners under the ROT clause.130 To avoid the awkward 
result argued by the owners (that they do not have to pay for the consumed bunkers), the UK 
Supreme Court recharacterised the supply contract as a sui generis licence to consume bunkers 
 
127 As Lord Devlin said Chow Yoong Hong v Choong Fah Rubber Manufactory [1962] AC 209, 216–17: ‘If in 
form [the transaction] is not a loan, it is not to the point to say that its object was to raise money for one of them 
or that the parties could have produced the same result more conveniently by borrowing and lending money.’ 
128 In Welsh Development, a relevant counter policy argument arose from the concern that sale structures with 
recourse could, as a form of off-balance sheet financing, render the trader’s financial statements misleading and 
unreliable. Ralph LJ considered this argument but ultimately decided that the redress of any such concern lies in 
the province of the legislature rather than the judiciary: see Welsh Development [1992] BCLC 148, 178–79. 
129 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v OW Bunker Malta Ltd [2016] UKSC 23, [2016] AC 1034 (‘The Res Cogitans’). 
130 A line of reasoning previously affirmed in FG Wilson (Engineering) Ltd v John Holt & Co (Liverpool) Ltd 
[2013] EWCA Civ 779, [2014] 1 WLR 2365.  
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for the propulsion of vessels.131  That meant, significantly, that the transaction was not a 
contract for the sale of goods to which the SOGA applied. However, while this preserved the 
seller’s rights to sue for price on the sui generis contract, the decision is astounding in 
overturning the widely-held assumption that the SOGA governed sales of goods subject to 
ROT clauses. Given that ROT clauses are widely adopted on the (implicit if not express) 
understanding that the buyer could use, consume or sell the goods before payment is due, to 
exclude such contracts from the ambit of the SOGA is virtually to deprive the Act of all 
practical relevance.132 Outside the SOGA framework, it is also uncertain how this new category 
of sui generis contracts would be interpreted.133 Ironically, therefore, The Res Cogitans has, in 
vindicating the seller’s rights, also greatly destabilised the law on contracts subject to ROT 
clauses. In large part, this unfortunate outcome is the result of an excessively formal analysis. 
‘Title fundamentalism’,134 combined with a narrow view of ‘contractual interpretation’, have 
the unwitting effect of excluding from the court’s view the policies that underpin the historical 
development of ROT clauses. As a ubiquitous feature of modern trade, ROT clauses serve a 
useful function in facilitating credit financing by securing the seller’s interests in the event of 
the buyer’s insolvency. On that view, such clauses are a mechanism that reorders proprietary 
interests in the limited context of insolvency but were not intended to alter the nature of the 
underlying transaction as a sale, nor to prevent the seller from suing for price when the buyer 
is solvent.135 Sales on credit that envisage the consumption of goods before property passes 
and payment is due have become widespread precisely because they strike a fair balance 
between the buyer’s need for credit and the seller’s need for security.136 Against this backdrop, 
the recharacterisation in The Res Cogitans is puzzling: it is difficult to see why credit sales on 
ROT terms should be excluded from the SOGA when they do not offend the policies of the 
 
131 The Court reasoned that since the contract specifically contemplated that the bunkers could be consumed before 
payment was due without any property passing in the bunkers consumed, the contract did not meet the definition 
of a ‘sale’ under s 2(1) of the SOGA, viz, a contract by which a seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property 
in the goods to the buyer for a money consideration: see The Res Cogitans [2016] UKSC 23, [2016] AC 1034 
[26]–[28]. 
132 L Gullifer, ‘“Sales” on Retention of Title Terms: Is the English Law Analysis Broken?’ (2017) 133 LQR 244, 
259; KFK Low and KCF Loi, ‘Bunkers in Wonderland: A Tale of How the Growth of Romalpa Clauses Shrank 
the English Law of Sales’ [2018] Journal of Business Law 229, 247–48.   
133 Discussed in M Bridge, ‘The UK Supreme Court Decision in the Res Cogitans and the Cardinal Role of 
Property in Sales Law’ [2017] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 345. See also Gullifer, above n 132, 256–60; 
Low and Loi, above n 132132, 249–52. 
134 See, eg, ‘the high degree of importance attaching to property matters in the law of sale’: see Bridge, above n 
133, 348. 
135 Gullifer, above n 132, 252–53. 
136 ibid 246–50. 
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Act. Had the Court given more explicit consideration to the legitimate economic functions of 
the ROT clause, it might well have adopted alternative analyses that recognise a sale as a 
sale.137 
IX. CONCLUSION 
At the heart of recharacterisation lies the question of self-determination: to what extent are 
parties free to prescribe the legal consequences of their acts by adopting particular forms and 
terms? The foregoing analysis demonstrates that English courts have largely addressed that 
question through a composite process of interpretation and evaluation. Construing the 
constitutive contract or document sets the stage for determining its legal effects, but its legal 
character is ultimately determined by weighing competing values and social goals. But while 
English courts recognise the composite nature of the analysis, they have customarily placed 
greater weight on formal rather than substantive reasons with the result that the latter are 
usually considered more obliquely or incidentally. This chapter has argued that there is a need 
for more explicit articulation of policy influences in recharacterisation cases. That is not to 
abandon settled rules and doctrines, but it does mean that courts should intentionally and 
scrupulously examine the policy underpinnings of a particular legal category to decide if the 
parties’ characterisation should prevail. The honest and open consideration of such factors is 
particularly important for developing new rules and doctrines (such as ‘illusory trusts’) or 
where recharacterisation threatens (as did The Res Cogitans) to unsettle a longstanding and 
widely adopted practice. Even in contexts where the rules of characterisation appear settled by 
reference to a particular concept or test (such as ‘exclusive possession’), the concept or test 
would still have to be applied with acute sensitivity to the underlying social objectives. Finally, 
if recharacterisation is essentially a judicial response to improper avoidances, then the judicial 
weaponry would have to be flexible and responsive to context, so that a one-size-fits-all 
approach – such as a universal ‘doctrine’ of sham – that applies across diverse contexts would 




137 Eg, by implying the term that property in the goods passed to the buyer immediately before consumption: see 
Gullifer, above n 132, 260–61; Low and Loi, above n 132, 252–53. 
